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In the essay Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, Jacques Derrida says it is important to trace the 
literary consequences of certain events in economic history: "To study, for example, in so-called 
modern literature, that is, contemporaneous with capital-city, polis, metropolis-of a state and 
with a state of capital, the transformation of money forms (metallic, fiduciary-the bank note-or 
scriptural-the bank check), a certain rarification of payments in cash, the recourse to credit cards, 
the coded signature, and so forth, in short, a certain dematerialization of money, and therefore of 
all the scenes that depend on it."1 The transformation Derrida describes is part of the 
development of late capitalism; though his essay analyzes a short story by the nineteenth century 
writer Baudelaire, the transformation away from "metallic" to "fiduciary" forms of money 
officially occurred in the twentieth century, as did the spread of credit cards and coded 
signatures. As the economic historian Randall Hinshaw notes, during the twentieth century 
"commodity money is gradually being displaced by fiduciary money ... in 1937, gold or 
commodity money made up about 91% of the world's monetary reserves . . . this figure had 
dropped to 49% in mid-1966."2 In other words, fiduciary money became the dominant form of 
money at just about the time that Derrida began developing his literary theories.  
Derrida seems to define "fiduciary" money as bank notes and bank checks but in international 
exchange the term refers to money backed by reserve positions. Derrida's awareness of such 
money may derive from remarkable economic events during the decade when he was writing his 
essay. Tracing deconstruction back to the 1970s is a common critical gesture, but only in terms 
of politics; for example, Tobin Siebers sees it as a product of cold war suspiciousness; Raman 
Selden, as the intellectual follow-up to '60s radicalism; and Barbara Foley, as a development of 
liberal pluralism.3 But consider as well the relevance for deconstruction of the economic 
transformation that occurred in 1971, when all currencies became fiduciary monies as the 
mechanisms of international exchange dropped all reference to metals or other "specie." Milton 
Friedman describes the revolutionary nature of this change:  
Until 1971, departures from an international specie standard, at least by major countries, 
took place infrequently and only at times of crisis. Fisher concluded in 1911 that 
"irredeemable paper money has almost invariably proved a curse to the country 
employing it,". . . The declining importance of the international specie standard and its 
final termination in 1971 have changed the situation drastically. "Irredeemable paper 
money" is no longer an expedient grasped at in times of crisis; it is the normal state of 
affairs in countries at peace, facing no domestic crises, political or economic, and with 
governments fully capable of obtaining massive resources through explicit taxes. This is 
an unprecedented situation. We are in unexplored terrain.4  
The unexplored terrain that emerged in the 1970s is the world of dematerialized currencies that 
Derrida believes has somehow transformed literature. Lifting the "curse" on irredeemable monies 
is tantamount to lifting the curse on signs that operate without reference, a central element of 
Derrida's linguistic project.  
The economic transformation of money in 1971 is in peculiar ways tied to the radical politics of 
the 1960s, as we can see by noting that in France an important suspension of convertibility of the 
franc occurred in May, 1968, in direct response to the threat of a General Strike. The radical 
disruption of the social order that seemed to many linked to the disruptions of deconstruction led 
to-or was countered by-the ending of "reference" in that most fundamental "sign" in the capitalist 
system, money. Jean Baudrillard recognizes a relationship between the new kind of rebellion of 
the left in the 1960s, the demise of the gold standard, and deconstruction, though his way of 
characterizing this complex relationship is to say that the development of an economic system 
based on what he calls "uncontrollable play" marked the end of the possibility of "materialist" 
contradictions, the end of the Marxist dialectic in which changes in means of production generate 
changes in the social order, so that a new form of resistance (to signs) was needed. He concludes 
that at a certain point in history, production was "elevat[ed] . . . to a total abstraction, . . . to the 
power of a code, which no longer even risks being called into question by an abolished referent" 
(his emphasis).5 Then in a footnote he explains that, "economically, this process culminates in 
the virtual international autonomy of finance capital, in the uncontrollable play of floating 
capital. Once currencies are extracted from all production cautions, and even from all reference 
to the gold standard, general equivalence becomes the strategic place of manipulation. Real 
production is everywhere subordinated to it. This apogee of the system corresponds to the 
triumph of the code" (129 n. 9).  
Baudrillard's comments suggest a peculiar relationship between deconstruction, sixties' 
radicalism, and the new definitions of money. The end of the gold standard results in 
uncontrollable play of capital, which sounds like the freeplay that Derrida finds in language. In 
fact, if we read the new "definition" of a currency, it seems very much like a Derridean 
description of the endless "dissemination without return" of linguistic signifiers-to define one 
sign is merely to put up other signs, and so on, never reaching any end. The dollar is redefined so 
that it is no longer a "silver certificate," a paper referring to physical objects, but rather simply a 
"federal reserve note," a note indicating that the Federal Reserve System owes the bearer a 
dollar. To have a dollar is to be owed a dollar: the sign that represents money actually represents 
that one has the right to another sign.  
After the 1970s, the question of what backs up currencies is no longer answered by an image of a 
huge stockpile of gold, but rather by a reserve system; internationally, this takes the form of the 
International Monetary Fund, or IMF, in which countries hold "reserve positions" or "s.d.r.'s," 
"standard drawing rights"; they are granted rights to borrow, and those rights back up their 
currencies. Internationally, a dollar is now defined as a "basket" of so many marks plus so many 
yen, so many pounds, so many of every currency-and similarly a mark is so many dollars plus so 
many yen, and so on. Defining a currency in terms of a basket of other currencies does rather 
seem like a system of freeplay of signifiers: searching for the "meaning" of one monetary sign 
leads only to an infinite sequence of other signs and ultimately circles back to the same sign. 
Monetary signifiers are defined in terms of their differences from other signifiers, not in terms of 
any signified.  
Payment across countries is no longer even mythologized as the transfer of objects; indeed 
payment in effect no longer exists at all; rather, payment has become the transfer of debt from 
one country to another. If being given an IOU is a way of deferring payment, the current 
economic system has made such deferrals permanent. The meaning of economic signs no longer 
derives from reference but rather from a code.  
Such changes in economics do not happen all at once and are never complete and uniform across 
the entire field of economic activity. New economic concepts emerge long before they become 
orthodoxy, and sometimes such concepts appear first in non-economic texts, as ironic mockery 
of common practices or descriptions of other social systems or even just imaginary possibilities. 
In Given Time, Derrida in effect retraces the long process of subtle changes in economic notions 
which led up to the final dematerialization of money in 1971, by citing from texts published near 
crucial moments in the history of the transformation of money. Derrida focuses particularly on 
an ironic story by Baudelaire, "The Counterfeit Coin," published in 1864, and on an account of 
the economics of "primitive" societies by Marcel Mauss, The Gift, published in 1925. Near each 
of these publication dates there was a significant change in the way Western governments backed 
up the money they issued, and elements in these texts reflect those changes. When Baudelaire 
wrote his story about counterfeit money, there was considerable international anxiety about 
governments issuing money backed by nothing, particularly the U.S. during the Civil War, which 
paid its troops with "Greenbacks" that it printed quite freely. In reaction to this anxiety, the 
official international gold standard was instituted in 1881. The gradual dematerialization that 
Derrida wants to trace was the undoing of this international treaty.  
Baudelaire may not have paid much attention to international finance, but he was peculiarly 
sensitive to the issue of spending beyond one's means and going into debt, because early in his 
life he went through his family fortune so rapidly that his relatives came together in 1844 and put 
his inheritance under their legal control so he could not spend himself into serious debt.6 In 
effect, when he wrote the story Derrida cites, Baudelaire was suffering under a personal version 
of the policy that would become international law in 1881: a legal restriction on the ability to 
spend beyond one's means. Derrida reads into Baudelaire's comments about the possibility of 
wealth emerging from the circulation of counterfeits a step towards the dematerialization of 
money that would emerge in the twentieth century. Baudelaire was certainly chafing under his 
inability to spend beyond his reserves, but to say that he is simply exploring a new economic 
idea is to ignore the irony of the story, which depends on the reader's familiarity with the 
nineteenth-century morality of spending only what one had earned. Indeed, Baudelaire's pleasure 
in telling the tale depends on the sense that circulating a false coin would be considered an evil 
act, so that the contemplation of the apparently lovely temporary results of such an act could 
come under the rubric of Baudelaire's general interest in the "flowers of evil." The story adopts 
an ironic stance towards circulating counterfeits, but depends on the anxiety about 
dematerialization that led to the official gold standard.  
Derrida projects quite a bit of later economic history back onto this story, including not only 
dematerialization but the transformation into a consumerist economy which occurred from 
around 1880 to around 1920. The first thing Derrida focuses on in the story is that the scene is set 
outside a tobacco shop. Derrida describes tobacco as "the object of pure and luxurious 
consumption ... an expenditure at a loss that produces a pleasure . . . tobacco seems to open onto 
the scene of desire beyond need" (GT 107). Baudelaire certainly admired lives devoted to 
consumption, writing extensively about dandies, but he would have thoroughly resisted the 
notion that such consumption could someday be the norm for everyone; indeed, much of the 
pleasure of contemplating the dandy is his difference from the average dull, thrifty, bourgeois 
citizen.  
The dandy becomes an important figure in social commentary and literary circles at the end of 
the nineteenth century, but disappears from discussion early in the twentieth, precisely as 
consumerism spreads to becoming the basis of economic morality throughout all classes. 
Lawrence Birken traces this transformation in economic history in terms rather similar to 
Derrida's: desire replaces need as the basis of economics.7 But this transformation is not the 
move to some mysterious realm of "luxurious consumption" as Derrida suggests; rather it is the 
move to everyday consumerism. One small sign of the move from needs to desires is a change in 
economic textbooks: in the nineteenth century, every text began with production and with an 
account of the needs that production hoped to satisfy; in the twentieth, every text begins with 
demand, with desires.  
The moment when consumerism finally replaced productivism as the basis of economics is 
roughly the moment, 1925, when the other writer Derrida highlights-Marcel Mauss-published his 
treatise, The Gift. The 1920s were a period of rapid transformation of economic morality in 
which saving became much less important then spending, and the average person gained for the 
first time the ability as a part of normal life to spend more than savings-in other words, to go into 
debt. This ability came about in reaction to the emergence of the automobile, which led to radical 
changes in lending laws to allow average persons to buy cars on time. To give a sense of this 
transformation, the economic historian Martha Olney notes that before 1920, the average 
American had twice as much in savings as in debt; by 1925, this ratio had been reversed.8 In 
other words, 1925 marks the year when average Americans began spending more than they had 
earned. A similar transformation was occurring all over Europe.  
What happened to consumer economics in the 1920s became economic orthodoxy in government 
policy in the 1930s when the Depression led to the worldwide acceptance of Keynesian policy. It 
was the Keynesian revolution that eventually made "consumption the new watchword," 
according to economic historian Geoffrey Barraclough, and it was Keynes who finally 
normalized the role of spending more than earnings-deficit spending in governmental policy.9  
Derrida presents Mauss's gift economy in terms that connect it to the economic transformations 
of the Keynesian era. Derrida quotes at length a passage from Mauss in which Mauss seems to 
recognize that the new governmental policies, such as Social Security, are steps towards the kind 
of gift economy he advocates. The result of such policies, Mauss says, is that "we will rediscover 
motives for living and acting that are still prevalent in many societies and classes: the joy of 
public giving; the delight in generous expenditure on the arts; the pleasure in hospitality and in 
private and public festival. Social security, the solicitude of the mutuality, of the cooperative, of 
the professional group, of all those legal entities upon which English law bestows the name of 
'Friendly Societies'-all are . . . better than the mean life afforded by the daily wage set by 
management, and even better than capitalist saving" (quoted in GT 65). Mauss implies here that 
the gift economy which he found in "primitive" social systems was also emerging in the early 
twentieth century within capitalist society. Derrida describes Mauss as searching for an 
alternative economics that is neither "capitalist mercantilism" nor "Marxist communism" 
(G7"44).  
Quite a few economists were searching in the 1920s and 30s for such an alternative, including 
Keynes, John Hobson, and one C. H. Douglas, who proposed what could be called an entirely 
"gift-based" economy. Douglas called his system "Social Credit," because he advocated 
replacing money entirely with credit given out by the government, but an unusual kind of credit, 
because nobody needed to pay it back. He wanted money to be recognized as a free gift from the 
government, adjusted each year to keep ahead of production so that depressions could not 
happen. Keynes acknowledged that Douglas was a major influence on his deficit economics, and 
all the governmental programs such as Social security and WI3A projects which followed upon 
Keynesian influences in effect were modified versions of the move toward a gift economy.  
Derrida highlights the centrality of credit in Mauss's gift economy, putting in italics Mauss's 
statement that "the gift necessarily entails the notion of credit" (GT 45). Derrida then goes on to 
make the remarkable claim that credit has the same position in the economic system that 
différance has in linguistic systems. he says this in an account of Aristotle's distinction between 
chrematistics and economy. Chrematistics is the system of monetary circulation, a system that 
Derrida says "has no limit in principle. Economy, on the other hand, that is, management of the 
oikos, of the home, the family, or the hearth, is limited to the goods necessary to life" (GT 
158).10 The distinction, Derrida says, depends on the "limit between the supposed finiteness of 
need and the presumed infinity of desire, the transcendence of need by desire" (GT 158). He then 
writes this sentence: "As soon as there is monetary sign-and first of all sign-that is, difference 
and credit, the oikos is opened and cannot dominate its limit." Difference and credit are 
presented here as two essential features of signs that have the same result: they make it 
impossible to maintain any limits or to have a closed system; they move one from an economics 
ruled by needs to one ruled by desires. Derrida's phrasing and his turn to Aristotle imply that 
credit has been a part of the economic system about as long as there has been money, but I am 
trying to show that in fact in Western nations credit only becomes a normal and regular part of 
oikos, home or consumer economics, from the 1920s on, bringing into everyday consciousness 
the notion of desires beyond needs.  
After his detailed examination of the ways in which Mauss's gift economy and its notion of 
credit bears similarity to Derridean linguistic structures, such as différance, Derrida's argument 
takes a rather surprising turn: he goes on to argue that a gift economy could never exist, because 
in such a world a gift-giver would be expecting a return, and so would not be really giving gifts. 
To create a gift economy, Derrida says, one has to imagine a "happy medium" between a 
"Shylock" and a "monk" (GT 65). In claiming that the gift economy is impossible, Derrida in 
effect moves beyond Mauss and the 1920s, joining the tide of economic theory of the 1970s, the 
tide that overthrew the Keynesian orthodoxy. Critics of Keynesian theory argue that Keynesian 
economics is impossible in very much the same way that Derrida argues that the gift economy is 
impossible. For example, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, founders of the new Rational 
Expectations Economics, argue that Keynesian policies of increasing government spending to 
counter downturns in the economy are impossible because "countercyclical policy must itself be 
unforeseeable by private agents . . . while at the same time be systematically related to the state 
of the economy. Effectiveness, then, rests on the inability of private agents to recognize 
systematic patterns in monetary and fiscal policy."11 In other words, the excess money 
distributed by the government to counter business cycles must seem an incalculable addition, 
"unforeseeable," a pure gift. At the same time, it must be "systematic," in other words, carefully 
calculated by government agents. The government has to then act like a Shylock, cannily 
calculating returns, and at the same time appear to be a monk, giving money away beyond all 
reason. Lucas and Sargent argue that private agents would always see through the image of 
monkish generosity to the Shylockian calculation, and so would plan for what is supposed to be 
unforeseeable generosity, destroying the gift-effect of deficit spending. Derrida's denial of the 
possibility of the gift economy parallels anti-Keynesian economics of the 1970s, which 
characterizes deficit spending as merely an illusory gift hiding a form of usury (GT42).  
Derrida's argument against the possibility of a gift also ends up partly repeating what 
Baudelaire's narrator says in his story: the man giving away a counterfeit coin to a beggar is 
trying to please both God and his pocketbook, to give charity and calculate returns at the same 
time. Edward K. Kaplan describes Baudelaire's story as leading in itself to the conclusion that 
"charity is impossible."12 So one might think that Derrida, in saying that gift economies are 
impossible, is returning to the 1860s, not joining in the developments of the 1970s. Actually, the 
two possibilities can coexist, because the economists who challenged Keynes in the 1970s 
claimed to be returning to the economic theories of the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
calling themselves Neoclassical Economists.  
Derrida's arguments in Given Time come closest to those of one of the most important anti-
Keynesians, Milton Friedman. Friedman argues that money plays an important role in the 
economy precisely because it is a system for distributing signifiers which have no referent. he 
says that money is "a social convention that owes its very existence to the mutual acceptance of 
what from one point of view is a fiction."13 Sounding very much like a deconstructionist, 
Friedman goes on to say that money is a "veil": what it veils most is its own fictionality. 
Friedman criticizes previous economic theories for believing that the fictionality of money made 
it irrelevant, that one could always substitute the things actually exchanged in any discussion of 
what money was doing. Instead, he argues that changes in the sign system itself, in money, are 
some of the most important determinants of economic events.  
Friedman's theories, though developed in the 1950s, remained secondary to Keynesian theories 
until the 1960s and '70s, when the fictionality of money became much more evident as the value-
or the "meaning"-of monetary signs began fluctuating daily under the influence of rampant 
inflation. Before the 1970s, certain countries, notably France and the United States, maintained 
the appearance that monetary signs represented physical realities by holding large quantities of 
gold to back up monetary reference. Pictures of Fort Knox were circulated as evidence of the 
backing of the dollar. After the 1970s, the U.S. eliminated its rigid gold price and eliminated its 
national stockpile. The fictionality of money became an important economic tenet of all 
governments and a commonplace of newspaper headlines declaring the latest inflation figures. I 
suggest that the economic developments that made inflation a powerful political buzzword 
contributed to the plausibility of theories such as Derrida's.  
The policies which Friedman advocates bear similarity to some of what Derrida explores in 
Given Time. Though Friedman accepts that deficit spending-governmental gift-giving-is useless, 
he still has a way to stimulate the economy: by steadily increasing the money supply beyond the 
limits of what is involved in current exchanges. In other words, he recommends that the 
government give money away without its having been exchanged for anything, money not 
backed by anything, a signifier without a signified, very much the same thing which fascinates 
Derrida. Derrida interprets the counterfeit coin in Baudelaire's story as the insertion of an excess 
sign into the economic system. He says that the act of passing a counterfeit to a beggar is 
emblematic of "what can happen to capital in a capital . . . in the age of value as monetary sign: 
The circulation of the counterfeit money can engender, even for a 'little speculator,' the real 
interest of a true wealth" (GT 124).  
Friedman does not, of course, advocate circulation of counterfeit money, but he does argue 
vehemently for the government taking very much the role of the man giving away the counterfeit 
coin: the government should keep expanding the money supply. The government must keep 
creating fictions, money outside the system of exchange, in order to cause real objects to appear. 
Monetarist economics uses the circulation of money it has created from nothing to "engender 
real wealth." The results of an expanding money supply are almost magical: "If any one bank 
receives an accession to its cash, it can therewith acquire additional noncash assets equal at most 
to that accession. . . . yet if all banks together receive an accession to cash, the banking system 
can therewith acquire additional assets equal to a multiple of that accession."14 Adding to the 
total supply has effects greater than the apparent added amount of cash: an excess emerges as an 
effect of the code.  
A crucial part of Friedman's theory is the tenet that no person can or should control the excess 
money added to the total. The process must be completely automatic, never adjusted in reaction 
to economic events, unlike Keynesian countercyclical stimuli. Friedman joins the Neoclassicists 
in arguing that economic policies cannot counter cyclical trends. But one can have an automatic 
excess that keeps changing the money supply in ways that produce a pressure to increase 
production (he says) and therefore allows growth and keeps the economic engine running.  
Derrida describes similarly the necessity of acts outside the circle of exchange-those seemingly 
impossible gifts-as crucial to keeping the economic engine going: "The overrunning of the circle 
by the gift, if there is any, does not lead to a simple, ineffable, exteriority that would be 
transcendental and without relation. It is this exteriority that sets the circle going, it is this 
exteriority that puts the economy in motion" (GT 30). Putting the economy in motion-pressing 
the throttle of the economic engine-is precisely what a constantly expanding money supply is 
supposed to do.  
The difference between the 1920s logic of Mauss, Douglas, and Keynes that represents 
government as a gift-giver and the 1970s logic (following Friedman) of automatic increases in 
the money supply is reflected in intriguing ways in shifts in literature from the 1920s to the 
1970s. Both economics and literature change from representing a world in which some important 
persons can stand apart from the chaos of the world and thereby create order to representing a 
world in which the system runs automatically, with no individuals shaping it. We can see the 
literary transformation particularly well by examining writers who represent economic issues or 
practices in their aesthetic works. In the 1920s, Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams were 
followers of C. H. Douglas's Social Credit movement, and wrote long poems, The Cantos and 
Paterson, that meditate on the notion of sovereignty, a notion that merges economic and artistic 
authority.15 Pound's Cantos trace a whole series of powerful governmental leaders (Malatesta, 
John Adams, various Chinese emperors) who are evaluated in terms of their ability to control the 
system of finance in their eras; as Pound puts it, "Sovereignty is in the right over coinage."16 The 
sovereign must be a genius who can adjust government spending in ways that no one else can 
anticipate, and so can counter the economic (and mental) cycles that threaten to lead to 
depressions. The leaders in Pound's poem appear strangely amoral-powerful, glorious, 
manipulative, and yet generous; they are the combinations of Shylocks and monks that Derrida 
says are necessary to run gift economies.  
In Paterson, Williams repeats Pound's credo that "sovereignty inheres in the POWER to issue 
money."17 His poem also investigates sovereignty by creating enigmatic images of larger-than-
life persons: it is based on the conceit that the town of Paterson is somehow the same as a giant 
man Paterson who is both thoroughly immoral and a potential sexual source of rebirth for the 
hellish modern world. The poem cites several tracts from followers of Douglas's Social Credit 
movement, and reaches a climactic demand that the government "[l]et credit / out" from its 
entrapment in bad fiscal policies because credit is the "'radiant gist,' against all that scants our 
lives" (P 183, 186). When credit is "stalled in money," Williams writes, it "conceals the 
generative" and "thwarts art"; credit as "gist" is thus a repressed energy, economic, sexual, and 
artistic, which could erupt if only there were the right sovereign figures (P 18). Williams also 
brings himself into the poem: he includes letters that describe (and condemn) his treatment of 
lovers; and he repeatedly asks himself how he or anyone can solve the poetic-and economic 
problems of the modern world. The modernist artist in Williams's poem, as in many early 
twentieth-century literary works, stands apart from the rest of the world, becoming a figure 
similar to what Keynesian economics requires: someone who can perform acts which remain 
incomprehensible to everyone else in order to solve the problem of modern chaos. In T. S. Eliot's 
terms, the modernist uses art as a way "of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the 
immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history."18 In giving shape to 
what appears chaotic to everyone else, the artist enacts a model of sovereignty.  
The rejection of the Keynesian model in the 1970s is basically the rejection of active 
sovereignty, the rejection of a government that tries to counter the chaos of economic cycles or 
to create a new shape for history. Anti-Keynesian economists argue, as we saw earlier in the 
writings of Lucas and Sargent, that no one can act in a countercyclical manner, because the 
system of cycles will always already have taken into account any leaders' efforts to counter the 
cycles. The only way that an excess can be found, Friedman argues, is to make that excess as 
automatic as the system itself. The notion of the impossibility of individual transcendence of the 
market or the code is reflected in postmodern arts of the 1960s and '70s, whose "flatness or 
depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality," according to Fredric Jameson, makes it seem that 
the "once-existing centered subject" that remained, however enigmatically hidden, behind 
modernist works, "has today in the world of organizational bureaucracy dissolved."19  
To give one striking example of the role of economics in postmodern literature, consider The 
Crying of Lot 49, a novel about mysterious signs appearing everywhere and the search for the 
meaning of them. No one in the novel finds any understandable system of meaning; nonetheless, 
the book manages to end, and what allows the search to end is one final act: the signs are put on 
the market. The book ends with its title, with the crying of a lot, the call for bids at an auction, 
and what is being put on the auction block at the end is a collection of objects marked with the 
signs everyone has been trying to understand. The novel thus finally turns to the market in order 
to end its fiction: what stands outside fictional signs and allows them to operate as signs is not 
reference or meaning but a market for those signs. This is Friedman economics exactly, letting 
the "meaning" of the most important signs derive from the market, not from any conscious plans 
of supposedly sovereign governments, corporations, or individuals.  
Derrida's texts are generally treated as emerging out of the worlds of literature and philosophy, 
not economics. However, by reading back from this essay to earlier ones, we can see that 
economics has always played a role in Derrida's linguistic analyses. Consider, for example, the 
essay "Signature, Event, Context," in which Derrida deconstructs the nineteenth-century writer 
Condillac's theory of meaning. Throughout this essay, Derrida describes Condillac's theory as 
one that sets "production" as the origin of meaning. Condillac's theory is based on "the simplicity 
of origin, the continuity of all derivation, of all production."20 Similarly, Condillac believes that 
"to write is to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine which is productive in turn" 
(S 8).  
Derrida's challenge to Condillac takes the form of a critique of production. Derrida argues that 
the meaning or value of a sign does not derive from its production: "The sign possesses the 
characteristic of being readable even if the moment of its production is irretrievably lost" (S 9). 
Signs are then "the nonpresent remainder of a differential mark cut off from its putative 
'production' or origin" (S 10). This denial of the importance of production as the source of 
"meaning" of signs may be a philosophical position, but it seems also to be a corollary to the 
transformation of the economic system from productivist to consumerist, that transformation 
which brought credit to seem the basis of the economy. In his critique of Condillac, Derrida 
brings in several terms to describe what replaces the moment of production as the source of 
meaning, but in his follow-up article, "Limited, Inc.," he says that there is really just one 
structure, the "parasitic structure," which he has "tried to analyze everywhere, under the names 
of writing, mark, step, margin, différance, graft, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, 
parergon, etc."21 In other words, parasitism, a form of borrowing and indebtedness, replaces 
production in Derrida's theory, as it does in the economic history of the twentieth century.  
Derrida writes as if what he is doing is simply arguing with Condillac in the ahistorical realm of 
philosophy, but I suggest rather that he is looking back at the productivist economics of the 
nineteenth century from the viewpoint of the consumerist economics of the twentieth, when the 
theory that physical production is the central engine of the economic system no longer holds. 
Derrida finds in theories of signs a parallel to this economic transformation: production is no 
longer the source of meaning of signs. Rather, a code produces meaning without distinct acts of 
production: meanings are then like a stockpile of objects waiting to be used.  
Derridean attacks on the connection of meaning to intention or production end up being 
interpreted as liberalizing gestures, freeing people from the tyranny of the subject. But Derrida's 
project hardly produces images of freedom; rather the code takes over, creating its automatic 
effects. Derrida focuses attention on one small sign of the inability of individuals to control even 
their own possessions: they cannot control their signatures. In Given Time, he lists "coded 
signatures" as one of the new forms of money. In "Signature, Event, Context," he presents his 
deconstruction of the notion of the uniqueness of signatures: "to be readable, a signature must 
have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and 
singular intention of its production" (S 20). Note that once again the key to Derrida's conclusion 
that signatures are separate from intentions is that they are separated from production. Derrida's 
deconstruction of signatures marks one of the fundamental features of poststructuralist discourse, 
the undoing of "subjects" as the originators and producers of meaning. This alteration in the 
nature of subjects derives in part from the rejection of production as the source of structural form 
and value. Without a fundamental concept of production, there is no "producer" of signs, and 
hence writers lose their sovereignty over meaning. Nations similarly lost their "sovereignty" over 
money as a result of 1970s economics. When currencies are defined entirely by their relations to 
other currencies (the market and the float), not by seeming reference to objects, the notion of 
sovereignty changes. Robert Triffin, who proposed the system of defining currencies in terms of 
baskets of other currencies, describes the problem of deciding the "meaning" of monetary signs-
their worth-as precisely a problem of accepting a distinct reduction in sovereignty:  
In a world where countries have become more and more interdependent, [there is an] enormous 
gap between the supranational nature of the problem with which we dealt and the multiplicity of 
national currencies, coupled with nationally determined policies which are often internationally 
incompatible. Yet it is clearly impossible to change overnight these tribal or national systems 
with which we have been living into a supranational system in which countries are called upon to 
surrender their precious sovereignty. This is a problem we can only solve gradually-through 
international, not supranational decisions. What I would insist upon, however, is that in doing 
this we should not forget that the problem itself is not a national one: it is an international 
problem.22  
The "gap" that Triffin discovers is very much the kind of gap that Derrida repeatedly focuses 
upon. There is a gap between the meaning of a given monetary sign and the intended meaning 
that the sovereign issuing nation would like to assign it. Currency gains some part of its meaning 
or value from the international situation; a daily posting of rates of exchange is like a constantly 
shifting dictionary. It is the crying of the dollar every day, letting the market shape the code itself 
into a constantly changing system. Pound's and Williams's belief in sovereignty over coinage 
falls apart in the 1970s, as it becomes clear that there is no sovereign powerful enough to control 
the meaning of money.  
We could even adapt this economic model into an alternative interpretation of Derrida's account 
of linguistic signs. Triffin's account suggests that to use a linguistic sign requires not merely an 
intention on the part of the person using it, but a system of exchange-a market-that determines 
how others will make use of the sign. One can "intend" to use a word in a certain way, only to 
discover that people take the word differently. Linguistic interactions are exchanges partly 
determining the meanings that words carry, and hence shaping the models upon which 
individuals build their utterances. The results of utterances shape the "intentions" that go into 
further utterances; such results even shape what a person thinks the intentions that supposedly 
preceded an utterance were. Triffin and Derrida both propose systems that would result in the 
deconstrucdon of sovereignty.  
In summary, then, I suggest we add to the list of disciplines that have contributed to 
deconstruction. In Of Grammatology, Derrida credits numerous fields, including philosophy 
(Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Husserl), linguistics (Saussure), ethnography (Levi-Strauss), and 
psychology (Freud).23 To this list, let's add economics, citing Keynes, who marks the end of 
production as the basis of economics, but who maintains the belief that individuals in powerful 
enough positions can still act to counter the effects of the system, and Friedman, who brings in 
the notion that the sign system operates separate from any individual agency. Historians of 
theory would probably prefer to cite Marcel Mauss and George Bataille as the ones who led 
Derrida to the concepts of gifts and of mysterious, uncontrollable economic structures. It is 
probably true that they figure more consciously in Derrida's own thinking than do Keynes and 
Friedman. But the emergence of deconstruction and its rapid spread during the 1970s are not 
merely events in the history of highly intellectual disciplines; they are also events in the broader 
history shaped by the changes in everyday economics and governmental practices. Keynes and 
Friedman developed theories which had material consequences; Mauss and Bataille were in 
effect mythologizing the events going on in mainstream economics.  
Mauss and Bataille may seem better predecessors because they were critics of capitalism, as 
Derrida is, but if mainstream twentieth-century economic practices in effect involve the 
deconstruction of signs as an everyday part of their functioning, then perhaps deconstruction 
should not be considered inherently anti-capitalist or even anti-authoritarian. Derridean theorists 
need to be careful when they generalize that a decoristructive challenge to one form of authority 
(such as the authority given to production as the source of economic value and the source of 
linguistic meaning) carries with it a challenge to authority in other realms, or even a challenge to 
the very idea of authority entirely. Derrida makes such an unwarranted leap when he argues in 
his essay that the power of a counterfeit coin to generate real wealth is equivalent to a radical 
disruption of patriarchy: the power of the counterfeit coin in Baudelaire's story, Derrida claims, 
reveals that "the phantasm" has "the power . . . of producing, of engendering, giving, rather than 
the 'True Father'" (GT 161). The image of a True Father, Derrida implies, depends on theories of 
production and human giving as the basis of prosperity, in other words, on outdated economic 
theories. In noting that the phantasm, the sign, the code, has more power of "engendering" and of 
"giving" than the True Father, Derrida might be tracing not the demise of patriarchy but simply 
the demise of Keynesian economics and of the liberalism of the 1960s, the demise of the notion 
that the government can wrap itself in the guise of the True Father and maintain the economic 
system by appearing to give gifts whenever recession threatens.  
By describing the results of the economic transformations he has traced as the end of patriarchy, 
Derrida's theory implies much more than has happened. The deconstructive revision of money 
into a system of signifiers in endless freeplay may be a modification of capitalism, one that 
capitalists and patriarchs opposed for centuries, but it turns out that it is possible to perform such 
a deconstruction without undoing much of capitalism or patriarchy at all-and Friedman did just 
that. Twentieth-century economics reveals that non-logocentric sign systems can coexist quite 
well with capitalism and can even play a crucial role in the functioning of structures of authority, 
which apparently can operate quite well without invoking any True Fathers at all.  
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